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The aim of this paper is to show that global scientific promises aka
“scientific worldviews” have an interesting history that should be
taken into account also for contemporary debates. I argue that the
prototypes of many philosophical positions concerning the role of
science in society can already be found in the philosophy of science
of the 1920s and 1930s. First to be mentioned in this respect is the
Scientific World-Conception of the Vienna Circle (The Manifesto)
that promised to contribute to the realization of an enlightened,
rational, and science-oriented society and culture. The Manifesto
was not the only “scientific world-conception” that philosophers and
scientists put forward in the 1920s. Also the scientific world-
conception of the philosopher and physicist Moritz Schlick, and the
Weltanschauung of Sigmund Freud deserve to be mentioned. Addi-
tional examples include Carnap's Scientific Humanism and the project
of The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science which was
related to American pragmatism as well, as is shown by Charles
W. Morris and others. Forgotten for a long time, since the beginning
of the 21st century, at least some of the Viennese projects are recon-
sidered in a new wave of “socially engaged philosophy of science.”
KEYWORDS
Charles W. Morris, Moritz Schlick, scientific world views,
Sigmund Freud, socially engaged philosophy of science, Vienna
Circle
1 | PROMISES OF SCIENCE AS PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Promises play an important role not only in ordinary life but also in modern science. Perhaps one
may even say that they are essential for science: A science that does not strive for the realization of
certain aims, i.e., one that does not make certain promises, will hardly get the necessary societal
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support for carrying out its research. In this way, promises of some kind or other play an important
role in a science, be it the mundane promise that it will help construct new useful technological
devices or be it the pseudo-religious general promise that this science will make an essential contri-
bution to find the ‘truth that will set us free’.
For the purposes of this paper, it is expedient to distinguish between two different types of scientific promises
to be called “local promises” and “global promises,” respectively. For instance, the promise that progress in engineer-
ing will mean that trains from Madrid to Paris only take 2 or 3 hrs appears to be a rather local promise that would
not, if satisfied, change the global structure of society. On the other hand, if genomic science fulfilled the promise
that a complete analysis of the human genome will lead to the invention of new drugs and treatments that enlarge
the average human life-span to more than 200 years, this would be classified as a global promise that profoundly
influences the way of living of mankind as a whole. Distinguishing between local and global promises may be any-
thing but easy. Many scientific promises, which first looked quite local, later showed an immense global impact –
changing even into global threats caused by science. This is an interesting problem but not one that will be treated
in this paper. In this contribution I'd like to deal with scientific promises that may be considered as the most global
promises of all, namely, those that can be characterized as global Scientific Worldviews. As Sigmund Freud put it, a
global scientific worldview in this sense promised a.
…unified solution of all the problems of our existence in virtue of a comprehensive scientific account
of the world, in which no question was left open and in which everything in which we are interested
in finds a place. The possession of such a global scientific worldview, in the German tradition often
called Weltanschauung has been one of the ideal wishes of mankind. When one believes in such a
vision, one feels secure in life, one knows what one ought to strive after, and how one ought to
organise one's emotions and interests to the best purpose.1
If science could provide us with a scientific worldview in this sense that would give us a means of organiz-
ing our individual lives as well as our society according to scientific, i.e., rational standards.2 Global scientific
promises aka global scientific worldviews generate philosophical problems concerned with problems of the very
nature of science. Scientific Worldviews entail that science no longer can be identified with “innocent” knowl-
edge that describes “nature as it is.” Rather, global scientific worldviews indicate that it is of crucial importance
to understand philosophically the relation between “objective“ scientific knowledge and “subjectively motivated”
scientific promises.
Up to now, neither science nor philosophy of science actually have generated a comprehensive scientific
Worldview, nor has philosophy of science agreed upon stable and unanimously accepted answers of how to assess
the feasibility and scientificity of such global projects. It seems clear that certain “knowledge interests” and “values”
of various kinds play an important role here, but it is far from clear what is the precise role of these ingredients in
the endeavor of science. At least one can say the following: If promises are essential ingredients of science, this is
evidence that science is not only concerned with facts but also with possibilities; in order to consider an assertion
as an at least prima facie reasonable promise at all, first one must believe that it can be realized and secondly that it
should be realized. These assessments involve valuations of some kind or other.
The problem of valuating possibilities is the more urgent, the larger the space of scientific possibilities is. What
we need, then, is a working theory of valuating scientific possibilities. Thereby science is to be considered as a sub-
system of society determined by, and, at the same time, determining society. From this perspective, the relations
1Freud, 1933, p. 195.
2It should be noted that according to Freud psychoanalysis could not offer such a comprehensive Weltanschauung. Even more, he
firmly believed that no science at all could honestly make such a promise. He did, however, believe that psychoanalysis, as an empir-
ical science among others, could contribute to diminish unnecessary psychological suffering. This may be considered as a promise
on a much more modest scale.
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between science and society are an integral issue of philosophy of science. This entails that philosophy of science
no longer can maintain that its proper goal is to “understand the structure and the meaning of science itself” with-
out taking into account the embedding of science in society. History of philosophy of science shows that up to now
philosophers have not yet found a stable and unanimously agreed stance with respect to the task of a philosophical
understanding of the role of global scientific promises for science and society.
Actually, the discussion concerning the respectability and feasibility of scientific worldviews (or how ever this ,
kind of global scientific promises may be called) is actually not new. The issue of scientific promises has an interest-
ing history and this history should be taken into account also for contemporary debates. More precisely, I'd like to
argue that the prototypes of many contemporary philosophical positions, which are relevant for contemporary dis-
cussions concerning the issue of scientific promises, can already be found in the philosophy of science of the 1920s
and 1930s. Hence, in dealing with promises in science it may be philosophically expedient to have a closer look at
the history of philosophy of science.
The outline of this paper is as follows: The next section briefly recalls the basic tenets of the Scientific world
conception3 of the Vienna Circle, usually referred to as the Manifesto of the Vienna Circle. The Manifesto was
launched anonymously in 1929. Its authors were the sociologist and economist Otto Neurath, the philosopher and
logician Rudolf Carnap, and the mathematician Hans Hahn. Until today the Manifesto may be considered as the
most influential example of a global scientific promise, namely, to contribute to the realization of an enlightened,
rational, and science-oriented society and culture. Perhaps less known is the fact that the Manifesto in no way was
the only “scientific worldview” that philosophers and scientists put forward in Vienna after World War I. There are
at least two other interesting examples of global Viennese scientific worldviews. In this paper I'd like to deal with
the scientific worldview of the philosopher Moritz Schlick, who was the official head of the Vienna Circle, and with
the Weltanschauung of the founder of psychoanalysis Sigmund Freud.
Philosophy of science never was, of course, an exclusively Viennese affair. Since the early 1930s the logical
empiricists of the Vienna Circle began to forge links with American pragmatism and other currents of “scientific phi-
losophy” in France and Britain. Particularly important for the issue of scientific Worldviews and their promises was
the collaboration of philosophers of the Vienna Circle and some American pragmatists in the project of The Interna-
tional Encyclopedia of Unified Science. One of the aims of the encyclopedistic project was to make scientific knowl-
edge accessible to a general public thereby fostering a general “scientific worldview” for society as a whole. From
the side of American pragmatism the main protagonist of the encyclopedistic project was the philosopher and semi-
otician Charles W. Morris. Indeed, Morris' project was to forge a synthesis between European logical empiricism
and American pragmatism.4
In the second part of this section we briefly deal with Carnap's Scientific Humanism that he sketched at the
end of his philosophical career in his intellectual Autobiography5 and that he claimed to be the core of the common
scientific Weltanschauung of the members of the Vienna Circle. By the 1950s at the latest the project of the Ency-
clopedia had faded away and the issue of global scientific promises and scientific worldviews gradually disappeared
from the agenda of mainstream philosophy of science. Meanwhile, the tides have changed again. Since the begin-
ning of the 21st century there is a new wave of “socially engaged” philosophy of Science. The paper concludes with
some brief remarks on this topic.
3The Logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle distinguished (at least officially) between “Weltanschauung” (world view) and “(wis-
senschaftlicher) Weltauffassung” ((scientific) world conception). They insisted that their Manifesto was a (scientific) Weltauffassung in
contrast to the many (non-scientific) world views. By hindsight one has to say that drawing a line between what is scientific and
what is not is far more difficult than the Logical empiricists were prepared to admit. More than once, even the members of the
Vienna Circle could be caught using the (more common) term Weltanschauung when the official linguistic ruling required Weltauffas-
sung. For a detailed discussion of the thorny issue to distinguish between the two concepts, see Romizi, 2012, 2013. In this paper I
will always use the more general term “world view” instead of the somewhat artificial term “world conception” except when I deal
explicitly with the Vienna Circle's “world conception.”
4cf. Morris, 1937.
5Carnap, 1963.
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2 | THE SCIENTIFIC WORLD CONCEPTION OF THE VIENNA CIRCLE
The natural starting point for outlining the Vienna Circle's philosophy of science and the role that scientific promises
played for it is the so-called Manifesto The Scientific World-Conception. The Vienna Circle (1929). For reasons of space
we have to concentrate on three of the Circle's main figures, namely, Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, and Moritz
Schlick. Even under this restriction it can be shown that the Vienna Circle's philosophy of science was anything but
a monolithic school doctrine accepted by all its members. Indeed, these authors have put forward quite different
theses concerning scientific promises and their philosophical assessments.6
The Manifesto (authored by Neurath, Carnap, and Hahn) is often considered as a rather crude philosophical
pamphlet that was not much interested in the more subtle distinctions of academic philosophy. This is a bit unfair.
The Manifesto was a “manifesto” i.e., a text that wanted to persuade as many people as possible pointing at some
rather complex issues concerning the relation of “science,” “life,” and “politics.” These topics not only mattered for
the early 20th century but may be relevant also for the agenda of contemporary discussions.
The “scientific world conception” of the Manifesto was only one among many rival proposals. In order to get a
better understanding of the Manifesto itself and its role in the broader context of the time it is expedient to com-
pare it with some other “scientific worldviews” of the time. This will help bring into focus the specific philosophical
shortcomings as well as advantages of the Manifesto. Thereby the possible relevance of the issues dealt with in the
Manifesto even for contemporary discussions may become evident.7 According to the Manifesto's high-sounding
closing remarks.
We witness the spirit of the scientific world-conception penetrating in growing measure the forms
of personal and public life, in education, upbringing, architecture, and the shaping of economic and
social life according to rational principles. The scientific world-conception serves life, and life
receives it.8
These elucubrations make it quite clear that the Manifesto was not so much a piece of theoretical philosophy
but rather an attitude: a set of recommendations, which served (and to a certain extent for some still serve) as
guide-lines for doing philosophy of science. Implicitly it entailed a particular set of values. Although the Vienna Cir-
cle's philosophers did not support any theory of objective values, they shared, more or less implicitly, certain values,
even if they did not provide a justification for them. For instance, they had a high esteem for science, conceptual
clarity, and the reliance on empirical evidence.
According to the Manifesto the scientific world conception was characterized by the fact that it
… knows no unsolvable riddle. Clarification of the traditional philosophical problems leads us partly
to unmask them as pseudo-problems, and partly to transform them into empirical problems and
thereby subject them to the judgment of experimental science. The task of philosophical work lies in
this clarification of problems and assertions, not in the propounding of special ‘philosophical’ pro-
nouncements. The method of this clarification is logical analysis.9
The authors of the Manifesto ascribed the merit of having discovered the power of this new instrument (modern
logic) for philosophy to Bertrand Russell. According to them, conceiving the new relational logic as the method of
6Up to now, the most comprehensive presentation of the history and philosophy of the Vienna Circle is FriedrichStadler's bulky vol-
ume The Vienna Circle. Studies in the Origins, Development, and Influence of Logical Empiricism where the reader finds a wealth of
information on the philosophical, sociological, and historical aspects of the Vienna Circle: Stadler, 1997.
7For detailed information about the “production history and early reception of The Scientific World Conception” the reader may con-
sult Thomas Uebel's paper of the same title: Uebel, 2012.
8Neurath, 1929, p. 306.
9Neurath, 1929, p. 305.
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philosophy was to bring about a progress in philosophy of the same kind of magnitude as had been the introduction
of mathematics into physics by Galileo. Similar announcements can be found in Carnap's Aufbau.10 Perhaps, Carnap
may have felt that the claim that according to the Manifesto there were no unsolvable riddles sounded a bit grandil-
oquent to some readers. In order to avoid this misunderstanding Carnap added the explanation that the elimination
of scientific riddles by a scientific world conception did not mean that all the “unsolvable riddles of life” would be
dissolved and disappear. For him, the riddles of life were not theoretical questions of science, but practical situations
that fell outside the ken of science.
Already in this early stage of the evolution of logical empiricism one finds among Carnap and some other mem-
bers of the Circle the tendency of strictly separating the theoretical sphere of science and the practical sphere of
action. Scientific knowledge was considered as theoretical knowledge, that was only of limited use for practical
problems. Later, this tendency was to lead to serious frictions with American pragmatism.
The implicit promise of a logical empiricist scientific Worldview was that science would play an essential and
indispensable role in the endeavor of bringing mankind a further step forward on the road to a progressive, more
humane society. The internal progress of science was taken as evidence that science would bring about also a socie-
tal progress in general. The contribution of philosophy of science in this endeavor was twofold: Internally, philoso-
phy of science helped clarify the assertions of science, making explicit the logic of science, so to speak. Externally,
philosophy of science helped science find its place in the global system of society, and, moreover, helped society
understand science, its possibilities, and limitations. Summing up, the authors of the Manifesto concluded:
The scientific world-conception is close to the life of the present. … We witness the spirit of the sci-
entific world-conception penetrating in growing measure the forms of personal and public life, in
education, upbringing, architecture, and the shaping of economic and social life according to rational
principles. The scientific world-conception serves life and life receives it.11
This concluding statement of the Scientific World-conception of the Vienna Circle can be interpreted in many
ways, but certainly it cannot be considered as a scientifically justified assertion in the traditional sense.
3 | TWO OTHER VIENNESE WORLDVIEWS: SCHLICK AND FREUD
The “Scientific World-Conception” of the Manifesto was not the only “world-vision” put forward in the scientific and
philosophical circles of Vienna during the 1920s and 1930s. Indeed, at that time, many “Vienna circles” existed, and
many of them presented their more or less scientific “Viennese worldviews.”12 These circles did not live in isolation,
and many intellectuals, philosophers, or scientists were members of two or more different circles, sometimes with
quite different orientations.
Complementarily, belonging to one circle did not entail that someone subscribed to the circle's official ideology
in toto. It goes without saying that in this paper we cannot give an overview of all these intellectual endeavors and
their global premises. Instead, I'd like to deal with only two of them which are of special interest for the topic of this
paper, namely, the issue of global “scientific” world visions put forward by them. The first example is Moritz
Schlick's account of the Vienna Circle that substantially differed from the version that had been put forward in the
Manifesto. The second example is Sigmund Freud's circle based on the “new” science of psychoanalysis which had
its own scientific promises to change the human condition for the better.
10Carnap, Aufbau §183.
11Neurath, 1929, p. 315.
12A rather comprehensive list of them and their characteristic features may be found in Edward Timms's work Die Wiener Kreise:
Timms, 1996. These circles were not isolated groups. Rather, there was a lively exchange of ideas and persons between many of
them. This held, in particular, between Freud's circle and the Vienna Circle around Schlick. Contacts between the members of these
circles took place even in the emigration (see section 4).
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The official leader of the Vienna Circle Moritz Schlick to whom the Manifesto was dedicated, heartily disliked it,
particularly for its leftist political bias. Indeed, Schlick's political convictions were opposed to many of those
endorsed by the authors of the Manifesto, and he had quite different ideas of how science, philosophy, and society
were related. By education Schlick was a physicist and philosopher and had obtained a PhD in physics under Max
Planck. In the early decades of the past century he had a close relation with Einstein and served as his philosophical
spokesman. Not being content with privately rejecting the Manifesto of Neurath, Carnap, and Hahn, he put forward
his own “manifesto” in which he explained his “scientific worldview.” As leader of the Vienna Circle he published it
as the opening article The Turning Point in Philosophy13 in the journal Erkenntnis, the official organ of the Vienna Cir-
cle in the 1930s. Schlick agreed with Carnap, Hahn, and Neurath that the natural sciences were the essential ingre-
dient for the formation of a rational worldview. In blatant contrast to them, however, he contended that science
had nothing to do with the “practice of life.” For him it went without saying that technological progress and applica-
tions were essentially irrelevant for the natural sciences. Rather, the aim of science was purely theoretical, namely,
the investigation of nature as it is. Consequently, science had nothing to do with the rest of society. This entailed
that according to Schlick the scientific worldview made no socially relevant promises at all. Insofar it is located
rather far away from most other scientific worldviews to be discussed in this paper. Schlick's account is particularly
interesting, since he attempted to determine the role of humanities (Geisteswissenschaften) for a comprehensive sci-
entific worldview. Schlick may be characterized as a partisan of a kind of Pythagorean aestheticism for which the
beauty of mathematical physics played a crucial role.
Philosophie und Naturwissenschaften14 may be considered as a popular version of the more academic Turning
Point.15 It is the elaboration of a lecture that Schlick gave in 1929 at the university of Vienna as part of a popular
lecture series The Worldview of the Natural Sciences.16 Schlick's terminology considerably differs from that used in
the Manifesto. He distinguishes between “Weltbild” (world image or scientific image) and “Weltanschauung” (world-
view): The natural sciences (and they alone) were said to create an image of reality. The task of philosophy of sci-
ence was to manufacture from this “scientific image” a “worldview”:
The transition of the scientific image of the world to the worldview is done simply by rendering
completely clear to oneself the meaning of the scientific image, by realizing what is actually meant
by it – quite similarly as viewing a piece of art is opposed to merely looking at it consists in the fact
that the specific colors and forms obtain a certain meaning, represent something, tell something to
the observer. Expressed differently: The scientific image of the world is not converted to a world-
view by adding new thoughts, but by understanding it.17
The error of the metaphysicians was, Schlick asserted, that they considered philosophy as a system of knowl-
edge, whereby the worldview would emerge from scientific knowledge by adding to it some new metaphysical
assertions. Thereby the scientific truths were embedded into a higher comprehensive system. According to Schlick,
the relation between science and philosophy was different, but nevertheless very intimate. He even went so far as
to characterize the philosopher's clarification of meaning of the scientific image as the “soul of all research”.18 For
Schlick, the paradigm for this “philosophical science” or “scientific philosophy” was Einstein's work:
Einstein's work, proceeding from an analysis of the meaning of statements about time and space,
was actually a philosophical achievement. … [T]he decisive epoch-making forward steps of science
13Schlick, 1931.
14Schlick, 1934.
15Schlick, 1930.
16In his paper, Schlick uses throughout the terms “Weltbild” and “Weltanschauung” instead of the “officially recommended” “Wel-
tauffassung.” Perhaps this may be interpreted as an implicit criticism of the Manifesto.
17Schlick, 1934, p. 384.
18ibid., p. 383.
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are always of this character. They signify a clarification of the meaning of the fundamental state-
ments and only those succeed in doing this who are talented for philosophical activity. The great
investigator is also always a philosopher.19
At a certain point, then, the knowledge of the (mathematized) empirical sciences becomes dependent on philos-
ophy. Philosophy is to become science, and science is to become philosophy in order to achieve its real beauty:
In other words, it is the philosophical activity by which the knowledge of empirical science achieves
the beauty of its results. The empirical investigation of nature does not mention philosophy, it bears
philosophy in itself.20
By its very construction, Schlick's scientific worldview did not make any promises concerning human welfare or
something similar. The aim of science was to know what is the case and to understand it. Science did not aim at
technical domination of nature. Thus, according to Schlick, the philosophico-scientific worldview is totally unrelated
to any mundane social and political considerations.
One question remains still open: where is the place of the humanities in Schlick's account? He explicitly
asserted that the intimate relation between philosophy and science and their eventual identity does not hold for the
humanities. In contrast to the sciences, philosophy does not contribute anything to the humanities nor viceversa.
The humanities always remain close to common sense. There is no domain of nature on the one hand, and another
domain of the mind (spirit) on the other. Consequently, the difference between the sciences and humanities was
not a difference of objects, but only a difference in the ways of how to investigate the world, namely, a difference
in methods. The humanities were based on common sense concepts. As Schlick drastically asserted, history today
proceeds in the same way as in the day of Thukydides. If a so called Geisteswissenschaft such as psychology no lon-
ger used non-common sensical (“scientific”) concepts it changed its character toward an empiricial science. The
humanities have to do only with human interests.
The scientific image of the world is produced only by the empirical sciences. … The humanities do
not yield knowledge, they are valuating. Only reason can draw an image of the world. In its highest
form the scientific image of the world is mathematical. Looking at the route that mechanics has cov-
ered from Archimedes over Galileo to Einstein, one can be only astonished about the immense
amount of ingenuity that was necessary to pursue this way, and which is available now in the com-
pleted concepts of science. In comparison, the historical disciplines only work with ideas that remain
quite close to those of daily life and intuitive nature. Thus one may say that in the basic concepts of
the humanities there is much more nature, and in those of the natural science more reason.21
The scientist had to be a philosopher in order to understand and to elaborate the basic concepts of his science;
and the philosopher achieves his worldview only from starting with the image of empirical science. For Schlick,
there was only one serious image of the world, namely, the scientific image.22 As is emphasized the scientific image
of the world was manufactured by the empirical sciences (and by the empirical sciences alone), philosophers helped
understand it. Then one may ask, what was the role of the humanities – if they had any role at all? According to
Schlick, their role is not purely theoretical, i.e., directed to pure knowledge (as is the case for the natural sciences)
but “experience-oriented” in the following sense:
19Schlick, 1930, pp. 9–10.
20Schlick, 1934, p. 396.
21Schlick, 1934, p. 395.
22Schlick never came close to considering the issue of the legitimacy of what later has been called the “manifest image” or the
“Lebenswelt.”
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The very last aim of the humanities (Kulturwissenschaften, Geisteswissenschaften) is to offer to con-
temporary man the possibility of re-experiencing the Erlebnisse of people of a by-gone age, thereby
taking part at them, resuscitating the past in his own soul. … This is the beauty, the power and the
irresistible fascination of the Geisteswissenschaften that they deal with human affairs only in service
of humanity. … Thereby they approach the sphere of art and move apart from philosophy.23
Schlick rejected any kind of perspectivism according to which the natural sciences only deal with certain
aspects of the world and the other sciences with others. For him there was only one kind of knowledge – he consid-
ered it as positively misleading to contrast the knowledge of the natural with that of the Geisteswissenschaften. For
him, there existed one only worldview, namely, that of the natural sciences, the only task that remained for philoso-
phy was to interpret it. The task of the humanities was to valuate the worldview determined by natural science.
Schlick subscribed to a fundamentally disengaged, esthetically motivated attitude. According to him, the fact
that philosophy did not generate a worldview through free and independent speculation, but depended in this
respect completely on the result of the experiential sciences, did not affect negatively the greatness of the philo-
sophical worldview, because a worldview that faithfully followed experience was much more colorful, artful, and
richer than one that could be invented by any human imagination. Considerations of technical usefulness played no
role in Schlick's account nor did he take into account any relation between science and society. Instead, his account
was motivated by mainly aesthetic or aestheticist considerations. His worldview was that of a theoretical physicist
for whom mathematical and conceptual beauty was the most important criterion.24
As already mentioned, in the Vienna of the first decades of the past century there existed quite a few “Vienna
Circles” in which philosophers, scientists, artists, politicians, and intellectuals met to discuss issues of common inter-
est. One of the better known Vienna circles of this kind was the circle around Sigmund Freud that was the meeting
point of people interested in matters psycho-analytical in a broad, not only technical sense. In 1932 the later Freud
published the New Series of Introductory Lectures into Psychoanalysis. The last lecture of the New Series had the title
On a Weltanschauung. It dealt with the question whether the new science of psychoanalysis could provide the basis
for a comprehensive scientific worldview. Freud gave a well-considered and balanced response that deserves to be
treated in some detail. First, Freud pointed out that “Weltanschauung” was a rather ambiguous and “difficult” word:
‘Weltanschauung’ is … a specifically German notion, which it would be difficult to translate into a for-
eign language. … By Weltanschauung, then, I mean an intellectual construction which gives a unified
solution of the problems of our existence in virtue of which a comprehensive hypothesis, a construc-
tion, therefore, in which no question is left open and in which everything in which we are interested
find a place. It is easy to see that the possession of such a Weltanschauung is one of the ideal
wishes of mankind. When one believes in such a thing, one feels secure in life, one knows what one
ought to strive after, and how one ought to organise one's emotions and interests to the best
purpose.25
Freud categorically denied that such a kind of Weltanschauung, which promises the solutions of all problems of
humanity, would be compatible or consistent with psychoanalysis conceived as a science. Rather, psychoanalysis -
as a special science - was quite “unsuited to form a Weltanschauung of its own; it must accept that of science in
general.”.26 The scientific Weltanschauung is, however, markedly at variance with the “German definition” of Weltan-
schauung that he gave above. According to Freud, a truly scientific worldview could and should not make promises
in a proper sense at all. It is characterized essentially in a negative and critical way by a limitation to what is, at any
23Schlick, 1934, p. 393.
24Schlick's high esteem of these factors is certainly due to the profound influence that Einstein's theories had had on him.
25Freud, 1933, p. 195.
26ibid.
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given time, knowable, and a categorical rejction of certain elements which are alien to it, namely, all kind of religious
convictions. Freud's scientific worldview subscribed to a strict and comprehensive empiricism, it asserted that there
was no other source of knowledge of the universe but the intellectual manipulation of carefully verified observa-
tions, no knowledge could be obtained from revelation, intuition, or inspiration of any kind.
Freud complained that, in contrast to earlier times, the 20th century had raised the objection that such a scien-
tific Weltanschauung was both empty and unsatisfying, since it overlooked all the spiritual demands of man, and all
the needs of the human mind.27 And he forcefully concluded: „”This objection cannot be too strongly repudiated.”
Indeed, Freud's version of a scientific worldview is one of the few that maintained a strong and explicit opposition
against any kind of religious Weltanschauung. No other scientific worldview showed so radically anti-religious con-
victions as Freud's.
The case of Freud's version of a scientific world vision is particulary interesting because it was strongly marked
by the results and methods of a “new” science, namely, psychoanalysis, and not, as is the case for most worldviews
propounded by philosophers, by considerations of already firmly established natural science such as physics. Never-
theless, Freud explicitly admitted that psychoanalysis was not in a position to create a Weltanschauung of its own. It
had no need to do so, for it is a branch of science, and can subscribe to the general scientific Weltanschauung. The
latter, however, according to Freud, hardly merited such a high-sounding name, for it did not take everything into
its scope, it was incomplete and made no claim to be comprehensive or to constitute a system. Scientific thought is
still in its infancy; there are very many of the great problems with which it has as yet been unable to cope. A Welt-
anschauung based upon science has, apart from the emphasis it lays upon the real world, essentially negative charac-
teristics, such as that it limited itself to truth and rejected illusions. According to Freud, a genuinely scientific
attitude always emphasized the provisional and restricted character of scientific knowledge. These features, how-
ever, contradicted the global, allegedly all-explaining character of global worldviews.
The scientific worldviews of the Vienna Circle and Freudian psychoanalysis were not unrelated. The authors of
the Manifesto tentatively considered the possibility that the psychological investigations of psychoanalysis might
yield an explanation of the fact that so many people succumbed to the errors of metaphysics. In other words, the
logical-empiricists hoped that psychoanalysis might provide methods for coping with metaphysical illnesses. At least
some logical empiricists had explicit sympathies with the new science. For instance, as late as 1958 a symposium-
Psychoanalysis. Scientific method and Philosophy - took place at New York University and it involved many former
members, sympathisants, and students of the two circles, among them Philipp Frank, Ernest Nagel, Heinz Hartmann,
Arthur Pap, Adolf Grünbaum. Frank, as president of the Institute for the Unity of Science, which may be considered
as a successor organization of the Vienna Circle in the USA, came to a cautiously positive assessment of the scien-
tific character of psychoanalysis:
[I]n terms of the general principles of Logical Positivism there is no reason for disliking psychoanalyt-
ical theories. It is a question to be determined by actual research, by observations and logical chains,
whether theories such as Freud's should be approved by Logical Positivists.28
Others, like Ernest Nagel were less optimistic and considered the scientific status of psychoanalysis as still dubi-
ous.29 Heinz Hartmann, a former member of the Freud circle in Vienna and a logical empiricist, emphasized in his
contribution Psychoanalysis as a scientific Theory that Freud always had aimed to ensure the scientific character of
psychoanalysis, although he admitted that the master may have not always achieved it.30 To be sure, Freud's plea
for a unified empiricist scientific worldview that took into account the achievements of psychoanalysis, does not
entail, of course, that Freud himself and psychoanalysis actually followed the noble principles that the founding
27Freud, 1933, ibid.
28Frank, 1958, p. 313.
29cf. Nagel, 1958, p. 55.
30cf. Hartmann, 1959.
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master of this discipline porpounded in his lecture. Indeed, many analytic philosophers of science asserted that psy-
choanalysis had failed to be a science or that it was even a pseudoscience.31
4 | THE WORLDVIEWS OF MORRIS' SCIENTIFIC EMPIRICISM AND
CARNAP'S SCIENTIFIC HUMANISM
Due to the political developments in Austria and Germany, namely the rise of National Socialism in Germany in
1933, and Clerical Austro-Fascism in Austria 1934, the Logical Empiricism and similar “scientific” philosophical cur-
rents began to disappear from the European scene by the middle of the 1930s at the latest: Most members of the
Vienna Circle emigrated to the USA or England. As a result of this forced emigration, logical empiricism, originally a
current of European philosophy, became an international philosophical movement. One of the protagonists of the
internationalization of logical empiricism was the philosopher and semiotician Charles W. Morris. Sympathetic to
the logical-empiricist philosophical project of the Vienna Circle, in the USA Morris became one of the most vocal
advocates for the “Unity of Science Movement” as Logical empiricism became known there. In the 1930s and
1940s Morris closely collaborated with Neurath and Carnap as editor of the International Encyclopedia of Unified
Science.
In this section I'd like to deal with two offsprings of the original Viennese scientific world conception, namely,
Morris' “scientific empiricism” and Carnap's “scientific humanism.” Morris's “scientific empiricism” may be character-
ized as the project of a synthesis of European logical empiricism and American pragmatism in the midst of the
1930s. For the first time it was presented to a wider philosophical audience at the First International Congress for the
Unity of Science that took place in 1935 in Paris.
For Morris32 the encyclopedia project promised a new phase in the collaboration between philosophy and sci-
ence. In this new phase, according to Morris, a new type of scholar appeared on the stage whom he characterized
as a “logician scientist”: This new type of scientist was neither content with the idle talk of traditional philosophical
speculation nor did he accept the shallow repetition of logically not analysed concepts and assertions thus common
in the sciences. Morris considered the program of the Unity of Science movement as the return of the venerable
ideal of a global science that comprehended philosophy and empirical science in a new form. Thereby, at the end of
the day, scientific philosophy and philosophical science would amount to the same. Both made the same global
promise, namely, that it was possible to construct a rational, enlightened culture and society marked by the
sciences.33
Morris strongly emphasized that philosophy of science had to be a socially engaged philosophy of science. This
entailed that philosophers had to get their hands “conceptually dirty.” Dealing with issues concerning promises,
risks, and threats of science often requires to rely on incomplete information, vaguely defined concepts, and some-
times doubtful argumentation. Philosophy had to get involved in these murky affairs, it could not always rely on
“pure” concepts and live an isolated life “on the icy slopes of logic” as the Manifesto had expressed it.34 A “scientific
philosopher” had to face the challenges of applied science. With this thesis of the unavoidability of “dirty concepts”
31cf. Grünbaum, 1984, Karl Popper, 1963. For a recent discussion of the various claims existing on the market concerning the scien-
tific status of psychoanalysis, see The Freud Wars: Gomez, 2005, and the literature mentioned there.
32Jointly with Neurath and Carnap Morris was one of the editors the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. This does not
mean, of course, that the three editors always agreed on every detail of their philosophical outlooks. This not only held for the two
logical empiricists Carnap and Neurath on one side, and the pragmatist Morris on the other, it also held, for instance, for Carnap and
Neurath. For instance, over the last years of Neuraths life, he and Carnap had a bitter dispute on the issue whether semantics was
acceptable for empiricists or not. Or, to give another example, the fact that Dewey published his pragmatist Theory of Valuation in
the Encyclopedia can hardly be taken as evidence that Carnap endorsed whole-heartedly Dewey's pragmatist theory of values. For
details of the vicissitudes of the Encyclopedia project see Reisch, 2005.
33cf. Morris, 1937, p. 3.
34cf. Neurath, 1929, p. 315.
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he agreed with Neurath, who had warned quite often his fellow empiricists of the Vienna Circle against overestimat-
ing the role of logical precision thereby succumbing to an unempiricist “pseudo-rationalism.”
Morris' “scientific empiricism” clashed with the proposal that Carnap put forward in the programmatic paper
Von der Erkenntnistheorie zur Wissenschaftslogik (From epistemology to logic of science), also presented at the Paris
Congress of 1935. According to Carnap, one should neatly separate the logic of science and other disciplines occu-
pied with psychological, sociological, or historical aspects of science. In opposition to Morris, Carnap described the
recent progress of philosophy of science as a process of distillation through which step by step a “pure” logic of sci-
ence had been distilled as the aseptic kernel of a scientific philosophy out of a metaphysically contaminated philoso-
phy of the past:
The main phases of the development of scientific philosophy may perhaps be characterized as fol-
lows: First the task is to overcome metaphysics, i.e., the transition of speculative philosophy to epis-
temology. The second step was the overcoming of the synthetic a priori. … To me it seems that the
aim of our present work consists in passing from epistemology to logic of science. Thereby episte-
mology is purified and dissolved into its elements.35
This “purification “of received philosophy of science led to a division of labor: The investigation of empirical
facts is the task of empirical science, the task of investigating the linguistic forms of the language of science is the
task of logical analysis. A third realm besides the empirical and the logical one is not admitted. Thereby philosophy
of science falls into two parts, a genuinely philosophical one, namely the “logic of science,” and in the rest, consist-
ing of certain empirical disciplines such as history of science, psychology of science, or sociology of science about
which Carnap had not much to say. According to Carnap, this program of the transition from epistemology to logic
of science was actually no longer a program, but already a fact. The only thing still missing was to make this transi-
tion explicit in order to carry it out clearly and systematically.36
Obviously, Carnap's program is hard to reconcile with Morris's according to which there was no absolute break
between theory and practice in science. Hence, there was no convincing reason why this should be different in sci-
entific philosophy. He considered the exclusion of political, societal, and quite generally practically relevant aspects
of science from philosophy of science proper as a sign of ethical irresponsibility:
It is important to distinguish dreams and fancies from expectations and proposals based on whatever
data is available and controllable by new data obtained in use. It would be a signal instance of ethical
irresponsibility to relinquish the demands which the need for a philosophically disciplined imagina-
tion imposes, and to turn the world over to the exclusive control of dreamers, adventurers, men of
action, and technicians.37
Morris's program was in line with the proposals of other American pragmatists such as Clarence Irvine Lewis or
Abraham Kaplan, who argued against making philosophy of science a discipline that exclusively dealt with the purely
formal aspects of the scientific language. Lewis expressed the connection of knowledge, action, and valuation,
essential for all varieties of pragmatisms, concisely as follows:
Knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance
of knowledge lies in its guidance of action; knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously,
is rooted in evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate action would
be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be impossible. Conversely, only an active
35Carnap, 1936, p. 37.
36cf. Carnap, 1936, p. 41.
37Morris, 1937, p. 20.
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being could have knowledge, and only such a being could assign values to anything beyond his own
feelings.38
Lewis' thesis may be considered as the core thesis of the pragmatist's cognitivism concerning ethics that virtu-
ally all American pragmatists endorsed notwithstanding a few important differences. The logical empiricist Carnap
never came close to it. At the end of the day, he remained a stubborn non-cognitivist.39,40 Carnap never openly dis-
agreed with Morris's synthesis program. But he was not very enthusiastic about it. Instead of discussing in some
detail Morris' critical remarks on the differences between Logical empiricism and pragmatism, in his Intellectual Auto-
biography (1963), in his reply to Morris Carnap attempted to pass over these differences with the following bland
assertion:
I am inclined to agree with Morris that the difference between my view and that of the pragmatists
is not as large as it might appear at first glance.41,42
With respect to the worldview of the Vienna circle in the 1920s and early 1930s Carnap was content to
describe it in general terms as “scientific humanism” that he characterized by the following five theses43,44:
1. Man has no supernatural protectors or enemies and therefore what can be done to improve life is the task of
man himself.
2. Mankind is able to change the conditions of life in such a way that many of the sufferings of today may be
avoided and the external and the internal situation of life for the individual, the community, and finally for
humanity will be essentially improved.
3. All deliberate action presupposes knowledge of the world, the scientific method is the best method of acquiring
knowledge and therefore science must be regarded as one of the most valuable instruments for the improve-
ment of life.45
4. The great problems of the organization of economy and the organization of the world at the present time, in
the era of industrialization, cannot be solved by “the free interplay of forces,” but require rational planning. For
the organization of economy this means socialism in some form; for the organization of the world it means a
gradual development toward a world government.
5. Socialism and world government, according to our present knowledge, give the best promise of a realization of
the ultimate aim that is a form of life in which the well-being and the development of the individual is valued
most highly, not the power of the state.46
38Lewis, 1946, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, 5.
39cf. Carnap, 1963.
40This does not mean that Carnap's non-cognitivist stance concerning ethics was shared by all logical empiricists of the Vienna Cir-
cle. For a detailed discussion of the the variety of views taken by the members of the Vienna Circle, see Siegetsleitner, 2010, 2014.
41Carnap, 1963, p. 862.
42How to describe the changing relations between American pragmatism and logical empiricism in the middle of the past century is
a contentious issue in history of philosophy. According to the “received view” pragmatism had been simply replaced by logical
empiricism when the latter arrived in the New world. Recent scholarship denies this story as oversimplified. Taking into account
important similarities and intense interactions between the two schools in the 1930s and 1940s many philosophers have come to
describe the relation between them as a sort of “convergence.” Others insisted that important differences remained. For details the
reader should consult the literature, see Richardson, 2003, 2007; Mormann, 2007, 2017; Misak, 2013. Probably, in order to be able
to obtain more specific assessments concerning the issue of pragmatic versus logical empiricist aspects, it would be expedient to
consider the philosophical evolution of individual philosophers.
43Carnap, 1963, p. 83.
44Traces of this worldview may be found already in Carnap's early (non-published) manuscript Deutschlands Niederlage – sinnloses
Schicksal oder Schuld? Carnap, 1918. For a discussion of early Carnap's worldview in the context of the German Youth Movement,
see Mormann, 201X (Unpublished Manuscript).
45Carnap, 1963, p. 83.
46ibid.
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The principles (1)–(3) are general principles of a rational secular worldview, which, outside an an anti-scientific
and theologically infected camp, are hardly in danger of being critizised. Things are different, of course, with theses
(4) and (5). They are rather controversial, but nevertheless they have never been seriously discussed by Carnap him-
self nor Carnap scholars.
However one may assess Morris's and Carnap's theses, one may safely assert that in the 1950s and 1960s their
influence on the then contemporary philosophy of science was marginal. In the second half of the 20th century the
perspective of a socially engaged philosophy of science began to look rather bleak. The issue of global scientific
promises, to say nothing about global scientific Worldviews disappeared from the agenda of mainstream analytic
philosophy of science. During the 1950s philosophy of science showed an increasing tendency to declare their
approach “neutral” with respect to all political and ideological differences. “Scientific” philosophy became more and
more opposed to “committed” or “engaged” philosophy. Commitment became the mark of existentialists, marxists,
maoists, and critical theorists, later to be complemented by ecologists and feminists. Without detracting from the
merits of those movements for a politically committed criticism of science, one may note that they did not fill the
gap created by the disappearance of an articulated, critical empirical philosophy of science as an institution being
capable of assessing rationally the reasonableness and feasibility of the various global promises put forward by
authorized and unauthorized people in the name of science.
5 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
Compared with the received philosophy of science of late 20th century, at the start of the 21st centry there are
signs that the tides have changed again. Since 2000, a socially engaged philosophy of science that takes seriously
the study of the relationship of science and society steadily gains momentum. A survey of the more recent activities
in this direction may be found in Cartieri and Potochnik's paper “Toward Philosophy of Science's Social Engage-
ment”.47 In this paper a wealth of actitivies and newly founded institutions engaged in this area are listed, among
them the formation of a Society of Socially Engaged Philosophy of Science (SEPOS). From the perspective of this
“socially engaged philosophy of science” the abstract epistemological Kantian question of philosophy of science,
namely, “What can we know?” should be replaced by a more “subjective” one, namely:
What is it that we want to know?
This is no longer a scientific question in the traditional narrow sense that can be answered by science alone. Rather,
an answer to this question requires a wise coordination and interaction of social and scientific values. This is an
endeavor that can hardly be expected to be carried out by scientists alone. Philosophers of science are called for. Car-
tieri and Potochnik are quite optimistic concerning the role that philosophers of science could play in this project:
The productive coordination of scientific and social values should not be shouldered by scientists
alone, as they are not particularly qualified for this task.
In contrast, the training of philosophers of science is particularly useful in this connection. Philoso-
phy of science offers a rich field of perspectives wide enough to capture the complexity of relations
between science and society and critical enough to assess the underlying assumptions, interests, and
histories of socio-scientific conflicts – and even to help resolve such conflicts. The skillset of philoso-
phers of science, collectively, includes a special “toolkit” of method and understanding. Methodologi-
cally, philosophers of science are trained in the use of critical analysis, skepticism, and dialogue as a
means to generate understanding.48
47Cartieri and Potochnik, 2014.
48Cartieri and Potochnik, 2014, p. 906.
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Whether philosophy of science can actually satisfy these high expectations, remains to be seen. In any case, the
changing fortunes of global scientific promises in the course of history of philosophy of science suggest that philos-
ophers, who deal with the problem of promises in science, should adopt a perspective that also takes into account
the history of this issue. This might serve as an antidote against the naive idea that the history of philosophy of sci-
ence has been a history of permanent and unilateral progress in the sense that today we obviously possess a better
philosophical understanding of the sciences than our forefathers. Rather, the more progress history of philosophy of
science made in recent years the more it became clear how much remains to be done for achieving an adequate
understanding of the still young discipline called philosophy of science. Thereby we may refute Adorno's dictum
according to which the history of philosophy is the history of forgetting. At least to some extent, SEPOS avoids this
shortcoming by acknowledging that already the Vienna Circle's account of philosophy of science (as expressed in
the Scientific World-Conception)
has clear social dimensions. It is focally concerned with improving human welfare … Carnap, Hahn,
and Neurath held a view of philosophy of science according to which the discpline plays a ‘super-
structural’ role in society that has significant social and political components. Philosophers are tasked
with articulating and advocating these connections, as scientists themselves must focus their ener-
gies elsewhere.49
The Manifesto, however, was only one among quite a few other worldviews concerned with science. SEPOS
does not mention any other socially engaged worldview except the Viennese one.50 This is surprising insofar, as the
social engagement of American pragmatism arguably was at least as eye-catching as that of Logical empiricism.51
This is not to suggest that pragmatism is generally to be preferred over logical empiricism if social engagement
of philosophy of science is at stake. Rather, I'd like to argue that contemporary socially engaged philosophy of sci-
ence should take into account a larger section of the spectrum of the various scientific worldviews of the past. This
may perhaps enable us to more consciously avoid possible blindspots and weak points of competing perspectives.
For instance, the obsession of certain logical empiricists against any kind of alleged metaphysics or the habit of
others to concentrate on subtle technical details of matters logical certainly did not help make more visible their
social engagement to a wider public. In this respect, the American pragmatism of Dewey, Lewis, and James is much
more congenial to a socially engaged philosophy of science than, say, the austere logical empiricism of Carnap. This
remark does not intend to play off logical empiricism against pragmatism. Rather, it suggests the need for a closer
look at the rich legacy of socially engaged philosophies than just mentioning the high-sounding proclamations of the
Manifesto. For instance, it would certainly be worth the effort to take into account Morris' rather forgotten “scien-
tific empiricism”52 or what may be called the Austro-American Logical Empiricism of Philipp Frank.53 In other words,
when the Manifesto is rightly considered as useful to help us imagine what a socially engaged philosophy of science
may look like there are good reasons also to take into account the other “manifestos”: Something may be learned
from them as well, perhaps even when they choose a path that differed from that of the logical empiricists of the
Vienna Circle.
ORCID
Thomas Mormann http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7727-0610
49Cartieri and Potochnik, 2014, p. 903.
50This does not only hold for SEPOS as characterized by Cartieri and Potochnik, it seems to hold quite generally for the new
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52Morris, 1937.
53cf. Frank 1949, Reisch, 2005, Mormann, 2017.
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